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Abstract 
Cooperation among genetically unrelated agents occurs in many situations where economic theory 
would not expect it. A too narrow conception of self-interest is widely considered the culprit. In 
particular, relying on experimental evidence in plenty, we consider strong reciprocity rules of 
behaviour, according to which it is worth bearing the cost of punishing those who defect, and we give 
analytical foundation to such behaviour – and more generally to cooperation-proneness. The basic idea 
is that most agents may include self-esteem in their utility function and actually produce or destroy 
self-esteem through their effective behaviour.  The latter amounts to introducing a moral system in 
individual behaviour in such a way to make it amenable to rational maximization. We also show how 
the presence of cooperation-prone agents may impact on the best contract in Principal-Agents 
situations by altering the convenience of gift giving and trust.  
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Introduction 
 
Cooperation among not genetically related agents is widely observed in behavioural experiments 
and also in everyday life, even when repeated interaction is absent. This evidence is very hard to 
reconcile with standard economic theory based on the assumption of self-interested agents. Recently, 
several economists have taken up the challenge of providing a general explanation of how cooperation 
can be established and maintained in a setting potentially open to free riding and opportunism. One of 
the most interesting strands of research is based on strong reciprocity (Bowles and Gintis 2003, Gintis 
et al. 2003, Gintis 2004) which represents a rather weak relaxation of the assumption that all agents are 
strictly self-interested. According to the strong reciprocity hypothesis many humans are ready to punish 
those who behave opportunistically even when this is costly to them. An adequate number of strong 
reciprocators may suffice to sustain cooperation when it would be impossible under more customary 
assumptions.  
The strong reciprocity assumption has several appealing features. First of all it seems to fit in 
very well with empirical experiments both in laboratory and natural settings. Secondly, it is capable of 
sustaining a cooperative equilibrium even in the presence of a large number of standard self-interested 
agents: the prospect of being punished by few strong reciprocators may be enough to induce them to 
refrain from opportunistic behaviour. 
However, we think that the analytical foundations of this hypothesis and its relation with the 
basic postulates of rationality might be generalized. The main purpose of this paper is to further 
develop the notion of strong reciprocity. More specifically we pursue three goals. 
The first is to argue that a rational foundation for a more cooperative-prone behaviour can be 
provided by the twin assumptions that agents include self-esteem in their utility function and the 
amount of self-esteem depends on how they behave in social situations. Such a model may encompass 
the strong reciprocity hypothesis as a special case.  
The second goal is to highlight those factors which make those agents who are responsive to self-
esteem in our sense effective co-operators. In fact, rational agents, however prone to cooperation they 
may be, will not cooperate at any cost and in whatever setting.  This is borne out by several pieces of 
evidence. We will show that other agents’ behaviour may be crucial in this respect.  
Related to this, the third goal is to show how the presence of a cooperation-prone Agent may 
impact on the best contract a Principal can offer. More specifically we will model a standard situation 
of adverse selection proving that a sort of gift giving contract, eliciting a self-esteem engendered 
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reciprocation on the part of the Agent, may lead to better results than contracts based on endogenous 
punishment or auditing.  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce and critically evaluate the strong 
reciprocity hypothesis.  In Section 3 we present the utility function of an Agent who is cooperative-
prone because she values self-esteem; we also illustrate how such utility function can lead either to 
cooperative or more traditional behaviour. In Section 4 we analyze a standard adverse selection 
problem by means of a Principal-Agent model with a cooperative-prone Agent and we compare the 
resulting solution based on gift giving with the different second best solutions obtained with auditing or 
endogenous punishment. Concluding remarks follow.  
 
2. Strong reciprocity: experimental evidence and theoretical foundations 
 
Individuals cooperate in many situations in which economic theory would not predict 
cooperation.  Gintis (2004) convincingly argues that it is not possible to offer a theoretical explanation 
of observed cooperation that fulfils some reasonable conditions1 while retaining the assumption that 
agents are strictly self-interested. Indeed, the latter is to be relaxed. To this end Gintis and Bowles take 
a clear stand in favour of strong reciprocity, “cooperation is maintained because many humans have a 
predisposition to punish those who violate group-beneficial norms, even when this reduces their fitness 
relative to other group members” (Bowles and Gintis 2003). The resulting human behaviour is called 
strong reciprocity and it is defined as an altruistic behaviour “conferring group benefits by promoting 
cooperation, while imposing upon the reciprocator the cost of punishing shirkers” (Bowles and Gintis 
2003).  
The distinguishing behaviour of strong reciprocators is the following: when they detect a defector   
they impose a punishment on her despite the fact that such behaviour is costly to them. The model 
allows for the possibility of private and imperfect signals of defections and demonstrates that whatever 
the cost of the punishment to the reciprocator and to the defector self-interested agents may find it 
convenient to cooperate provided that the fraction of strong reciprocators in the population is adequate. 
Strong reciprocators are considered altruistic people, in so far as the privately bear the cost of an 
action which is of advantage to the whole community. The empirical relevance of strong reciprocators 
seems to be documented by many experimental studies (Fehr et al. 1997, Fehr and Gachter 2000). 
                                                 
1 These conditions, as Gintis calls them are: Incentive compatibility, Dynamic stability, Empirical Relevance, Plausible 
Informational Requirements and Plausible Discount Factors.  
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More in general, there is large evidence about the existence and importance of strong reciprocity in 
situations involving public goods, common pool resource and in ultimatum games (Yamagishi 1986, 
Ostrom, Walker and Gardner 1992, Fehr and Gächter 2002).  
Being a matter of voluntary choice and given the implied costs, it is not a trivial task to reconcile 
strong reciprocity with rationality. Unfortunately we still lack a general model of the rational 
foundations of strong reciprocity or of cooperation-prone behavior.  
To this end it can be useful to start from Sen more recent criticism of the traditional “rational 
model” of choice that is articulated in three steps (Sen 2002, p. 34-35). The first is related to a notion of 
welfare which is self-centred, whereby “a person’s welfare depends only on her own consumptions and 
other features of the richness of her life”. The second criticism concerns what Sen calls self-welfare 
goal, i.e. the assumption that welfare maximization is the individual’s only goal. The last criticism 
points to self-goal choice, according to which a person’s choice are exclusively geared to the pursuit of 
her own goals.  
Sen clearly aims at enriching the traditional model by weakening, in particular, the assumption 
that people pursue other goals then a too narrowly defined notion of welfare. But of the three criticisms 
he levels against the conventional wisdom the less convincing is precisely the last one, essentially 
because we are practically left without an operating theory of choice. If people, as Sen argues, are 
maximizers but they care also about things different from their welfare, how do they solve their 
maximization problem? 
Sen does not say much on this and it is actually quite difficult to figure out which solution could 
be given to this problem. 
The solution we propose is much in line with Sen’s approach but departs form it in the 
assumption that people do maximize their utility function which is enriched with an endogenously 
determined “moral” variable. More precisely, individuals are endowed with a “moral system” which 
transforms their actions in self-esteem. The latter, as determined by such system, enters their utility 
function and concurs to define their choice within a utility maximizing process. Therefore, self-esteem 
brings about utility but its “amount” is determined by a “moral system” which lies outside the 
preference system sustaining the utility function.  
In our definition a moral individual has a high propensity to destroy self esteem when his actions 
are not consistent with his moral values. This will be reflected in his final utility given that self-esteem 
is positively related to utility. Therefore his actions in so far as they destroy his own self-esteem 
through the “moral value mechanism” are not determined by a too restricted notion of self-welfare. In 
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this respect we share Sen’s approach. However, the inclusion of self-esteem in the utility function 
(which could very well be defined a goal-function) allows us to treat the choice problem as a typical 
maximization problem and give formal solution to it. 
The explanation we offer seems capable of capturing the most important features of experimental 
behaviour. In particular, it fits in well with the observed attempts to induce cooperation through a sort 
of gift giving - as in the famous essay by Akerlof – and also with the apparent existence of limits to 
cooperative behaviour.  
In fact, in a much quoted experiment Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger (1997) divided subjects into 
two sets of employers and employees and considered their interaction in a Principal-Agent framework. 
First, the found that many employers offered generous wages and received reciprocating higher efforts 
with the result of increasing both their and the employee’s payoff. Secondly, they noticed that there 
existed, however, a relevant difference between the level of effort agreed and the level of effort 
applied. They observed that this was not the behaviour of a small group of fraudulent individuals, 
because only 26%, i.e. a small minority, of individual honoured their announcement. 
 Nonetheless, this evidence “is compatible with the notion that the employers are purely self-
interested, since their beneficent behaviour vis-à-vis their employees was effective in increasing 
employer profits” (Gintis, Bowles, Boyd and Fehr 2003, p. 157). Allowing the possibility of employer 
to reward and punish employees, Fehr, Gächter, and Kirchsteiger observe an increase up to 40% of the 
bet payoff of all subjects2. Gintis, Bowles, Boyd and Fehr comment is that “the subjects who assume 
the role of employee conform to internalized standards of reciprocity, even when they know there are 
no material repercussions from behaving in a self-interested manner. Moreover, subjects who assume 
the role of employer expect this behaviour and are rewarded for acting accordingly. Finally, employers 
draw upon the internalized norm of rewarding good and punishing bad behaviour when they are 
permitted to punish and employees expect this behaviour and adjust their own effort levels 
accordingly” (Gintis, Bowles, Boyd and Fehr  2003,  p. 157). 
The above situation can be represented in a Principal-Agent framework where: it is in the 
Principal’s interest to induce reciprocal behaviour by the Agent, and the Agent may choose to 
cooperate – even independently from any material punishment - because she is a social being, feels part 
of a “community” (altruism) and, at least up to a certain extent, will loose self-esteem if she does not 
cooperate. However – and this is an important point in a rationality based approach – such mechanism 
                                                 
2 Employers punish fraudulent employees (68%), reward employees that over-fulfil their contracts (70%) and reward 
employees that honour their contracts (Gintis, Bowles, Boyd and Fehr 2003, p. 157).  
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will not work in any case and independently from an accurate consideration of the relevant costs and 
benefits. The loss of self-esteem implied by lack of cooperation is not always high enough to ensure 
unlimited cooperation. In fact, as recalled above, experiments give support to the idea that there are 
limits to cooperative behaviour.  
We   show, within a unique theoretical framework, that altruistic individuals do not necessarily 
choose cooperative behaviour. Indeed it is remarked that “strong reciprocators are inclined to 
compromise their morality to some extent” (Gintis, Bowles, Boyd and Fehr 2003). The approach we 
suggest seems capable of explaining what determines this willingness to compromise: much depends 
on the characteristics of agents’ moral system and how self-esteem enters their utility functions. The 
latter are captured by a function which relates their self-esteem to the degree to which they reciprocate 
other agents’ gifts (or punish other people’s defections). It seems appropriate to talk of moral system in 
this case because what is relevant is the behaviour in itself and not the results it leads to.  
 
 
3. Cooperation-prone agents: Moral system and utility function  
 
Our analysis is set in a Principal-Agent framework which is broad enough to encompass all the 
interesting cases. We focus on the Agent and model her behaviour as determined by the interaction of 
two functions representing respectively how she creates or destroys self-esteem and how self-esteem 
impacts on her utility.  
Indeed, the key assumption is that the Agents’ utility depends on the monetary transfers (m) from 
the Principal – considered in comparison to the effort delivered - and on an endogenous variable, i.e. 
Self-Esteem (E).  
More precisely Self-Esteem positively depends on cooperative behaviour of which strong 
reciprocity is an important example and negatively depends on the gift which the Agent receives from 
the Principal – the gift can be defined as the excess of the remuneration over the reservation price of 
the effort, that is to say with respect to the minimum which would induce the Agent to offer that effort. 
The assumption is that, as the gift gets larger, the Agent will suffer a loss of Self-Esteem, if she refrains 
from making an adequate effort. The behaviour of the agent is, therefore, the product of two antagonist 
forces:  altruism and self-interest. Moreover the agent can have too little or too much Self-Esteem. 
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Above a subjectively given amount Self-Esteem becomes a bad (excess of a good) since it induces 
subjection and exploitation.3 Therefore there exists a satiation point, which we label
−
E .  
The dynamic of Self-Esteem can be represented by the differential equation: 
mefEQ
dt
dE ))(1()( −−= α , with 0≥α  a parameter that depends on social cultural habits (ethics) and 
0)( ≥ef  is the agent’s effort parameterized to the monetary transfer; Q is a logistic function bounded 
above4, i.e. DEQD ≤∃ )(: E∀ , Q(E) is a strictly concave function and twice differentiable, for 
∃∈ +RG  GE ≥ such that 0)( =EQ GE ≤∀ , threshold effect, and above a level 
−
E  the logistic function 
may be decreasing, i.e.   0<EQ for
−≥ EE .  
Compensation and the level of productivity can influence the utility of the Agent through both the 
direct and traditional channel and the indirect channel represented by her Self-Esteem. On the basis of 
these assumptions, it is also possible to identify the characteristics and the costs of a transaction based 
on trust and to establish whether they are lower than those of a contract with some type of penalties. 
We will return to this problem in the next section.  
For the sake of simplicity it is assumed that m=c that is the price of the composite good c equals 
one. Formally, the utility function U of the Agent is bounded from above:  
 U=U(m,E), such that U may have satiation in E or: 
 
-
-
EE if0
EE if 0
always  0
><
≤≥
>
E
E
m
U
U
U
 
The agent’s decision problem can be represented as follows:  
),( EmMaxU            [1] 
such that: 
mefEQ
dt
dE ))(1()( −−= α ,  for 0>α  and [ ]1,0)( ∈ef        [2] 
                                                 
3 Self-Esteem derives from feeling part of a community or a social group. If the agent obtains too big a transfer she feels 
like betraying her social nature and this will induce shame and disapproval. If the Self-Esteem is too high and the transfer 
too low, the Agent feels silly. 
4 Mathematically, the Self-Esteem is similar to a renewable factor (good) that reproduces itself by a Pearl and Verhulst 
function bounded above. 
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Considering the function ]))(1()([),( mefEQEmUF −−−= αλ , the first order conditions determine: 
0
0))(1(
=−=
=−+=
EE
m
QU
dE
dF
efU
dm
dF
λ
λα
          [3] 
Dividing the second equation for the first one, it is obtained 
))(1( ef
Q
Um
U EE
−−= α , that is the optimal 
solution for the Agent implies that her Marginal Rate of Substitution between monetary transfer and 
Self-Esteem equals her rate of (technical) transformation between them (Fig. 1). We are assuming that 
income can only increase by loosing Self-Esteem and monetary transfer is included into the agent’s 
logistic function. As a result we obtain a function of re-production of Self-Esteem given its 
transformation in income and we summarize this relationship by a technical rate of transformation. Our 
problem is similar to the maximum long-run utility problem: ),(limmax ttt EmU∞→ , the solution of 
which requires finding the sustainable values of m and E and is characterized by the first order 
conditions
))(1( ef
Q
Um
U EE
−−= α . 
 
Figure 1.  Agent Equilibrium 
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Graphically, the solution of the Agent’s optimization problem is the tangency between her indifference 
curve and the re-production function of her Self-Esteem. 
The interpretation of this condition is therefore the following: a maximizing individual will take 
her own moral values into account when making a choice. The moral values determine what has just 
been called the technical rate of transformation between self-esteem and monetary advantages, while 
the marginal rate of substitution represents how the individual is ready to trade off monetary benefits 
against higher self-esteem. Therefore the choice is the result of the working of the moral and pleasure 
mechanisms. Moral values dominate the self-esteem producing mechanism while pleasure or welfare 
mechanisms set the rate at which the two goals can be substituted for each other. It is important to 
stress that the moral mechanism endogenizes self-esteem and allows us to understand that a moral 
individual is not only she who gets pleasure from self esteem but also – and especially - she who has to 
behave properly in order to reproduce self-esteem.  
Individuals are different from a moral point of view because they attach a different marginal 
utility to self-esteem or because they transform bad behaviour in a grater or smaller amount of lost self-
esteem. Our model allows taking both aspects into account.  
 
3. Trust and reciprocity in a Principal-Agent model with adverse selection 
 
When a cooperation-prone individual enters a Principal-Agent relationship playing the role of 
the Agent, the Principal may rationally consider the possibility of turning this proneness to his own 
advantage by devising a contract that transforms it into an effective cooperative behavior.  In order to 
achieve this result the Principal has to bear a cost (much of the gift-type envisaged by Akerlof 1982) 
which is borne in the expectations that the Agent will reciprocate. This may be taken as the cost of an 
implicit contract based on trust.  In this sense, trust which creates cooperation is costly and 
endogenous. It is worth stressing that cooperation-proneness is not the same as effective cooperation. 
Unlike other approaches, ours draws a clear distinction between propensity to cooperation (that may be 
understood as a form of altruism) and effective cooperation.  
In a previous paper (Basili-Duranti-Franzini, 2004) we have developed a model that allowed 
establishing under what conditions a contract based on trust may yield the Principal a higher return than 
alternative arrangements, like endogenous punishment or auditing. Building on that model we now 
consider how a cooperation-prone Agent may interfere with the choice of the best contract and how it 
could make the cooperative solution less costly. Our assumption on the utility function of the Agent 
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and the relevance of self-esteem has, therefore, an impact on traditional Principal-Agent models and 
may alter the relative convenience of different contractual arrangements.  
Consider a Principal-Agent model in which the information asymmetry concerns the productivity 
of the Agent that could be high or low (efficient or inefficient Agent), giving rise to low or high 
marginal costs, respectively.5  
Let θH be the constant marginal cost of the efficient Agent and θL the constant marginal cost of 
the inefficient Agent. Since the Principal cannot observeθ, he cannot equalise the marginal value of 
each Agent’s production, S’ (q), to its marginal cost.  
If he were to offer a contract calling for different compensation levels on the basis of the quantity 
produced and equal to the respective marginal benefit, the efficient Agent could simulate being 
inefficient (producing less) with a view to pocketing the information rent. The latter is equal to the 
difference between the two marginal costs at the low production levels or ∆θqL and it is impossible to 
write a first best contract. 
The Principal has to establish compensation levels by disregarding the equality between marginal 
benefit and marginal cost, or he has to define incentive and punishment mechanisms. In both cases he 
has to bear an additional cost with respect to the first best solution and, consequently, he will choose 
the less costly solution.  
The problem of the Principal is that of maximising profit that is the difference between the value 
of production and the associated costs. Profit is assumed to be a linear function of the quantity 
produced q.  
Let:     S(qH) and S(qL) be the value of production obtained with the efficient and inefficient Agents; 
mH and mL the transfer to the efficient and inefficient Agents; 
θH and θL the marginal cost of the efficient and inefficient Agents; 
 ∆θ the information rent; 
∆θqL the value of the information rent; 
v and (1-v) the probability to come across an efficient or inefficient Agent, respectively; 
Ls  the probability of discovering the inefficient Agent’s deception; 
))(1( Hef−α  and ))(1( Lef−α   indicate the rate of transformation of Self-Esteem into money 
for the efficient or inefficient Agent, respectively; 
c( Ls ) the cost of auditing the inefficient Agent; 
                                                 
5 To analyze this problem we rely on a standard situation of adverse selection, as modeled in Laffont-Martimort (2002). 
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PH and PL the amount of the endogenous punishment for the efficient and inefficient Agents. 
Given information asymmetry and adverse selection, the Principal’s profit maximization problem can 
be written as follows: 
{qL ,q H }
max{v[S(qH ) −θHqH ]}+ {(1− v)[S(qL ) −θLqL ]}− v∆θqL       [4] 
such that: 
(i) LHLHHH qmqm θθ −≥−  
(ii) HLHLLL qmqm θθ −≥−  
(iii) 0≥HU  
(iv) 0≥LU  
The solution of this problem induces the same production as first-best for the efficient Agent but a 
reduction with respect to first-best production for the inefficient Agent, with θθ ∆−+= v
vqS LL 1
)('  
Introducing an audit mechanism with an endogenous punishment (P) in the previous 
framework, other things being equal, the maximization problem of the Principal can be written as 
follows: 
)]}()()[1{(]})([{max
},,,{
LLLLHLLHHH
PPqq
scqqSvPsqqqSv
LHHL
−−−++∆−− θθθ    [5] 
such that: 
(v) LH qP θ∆≤  
The solution with endogenous punishment implies: the same production as first-best for the efficient 
Agent; a reduction with respect to first-best production for the inefficient Agent, 
with θθ ∆−−+= )1(1)(' LL
S
L sv
vqS . Crucially, only the inefficient Agent is monitored with a strictly 
positive probability. 
It is worth noting that the loss of efficiency for the Principal is lower in the case of auditing with 
punishment, since he obtains the following:  
θθ ∆−−+= )1(1)(' LL
S
L sv
vqS ≤ θθ ∆−+= v
vqS LL 1
)('       [6] 
Consider the possibility of resorting to endogenous cooperation (i.e. cooperative behaviour or 
strong reciprocity) in order to induce the Agent to refrain from attempting to obtain all the information 
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rent. The Principal pays a gift, or incentive cost, equal to GH and GL for the efficient or inefficient 
Agent, that are cooperation-prone. 
The Principal’s maximization problem can be written as follows: 
]})()[1{(]})([{max
},,,,{ ,
LLLLHHHH
GGqUqU
UqqSvUqqSv
LHHHLL
−−−+−− θθ     [7] 
such that: 
(vi) LHLHLHHHH qqmqmU θαθθ ∆−−≥−=  
(vii) LLHLHLLLL qqmqmU θαθθ ∆−−≥−=  
(viii) HHHH qmG θ−≤  
(ix) LLLL qmG θ−≤  
(x) 0≥HU  
(xi) 0≥LU  
Inequalities (vi)-(vii) represent the incentive constraints for the high and low productivity Agent, 
respectively, inequalities (x)-(xi) are participation constraints, while (viii) and (ix) imply a non-
negative gift for the two Agents.  
If constrains (vi)-(xi) are both binding, LHLH qefqU θαθ ∆−−∆= ))(1(  for 0))(1( ≥− Hefα , 
and then (viii) can be re-written as follows:  
(xii) LH qG θ∆≤  
The problem [7] becomes: 
]})()[1{(]})))(1((1()([{max
},,,{
LLLLHHHH
GGqq
qqSvqefqqSv
LHHL
θθαθ −−+∆−−+−−   [8] 
such  that (xii) is binding. 
The optimal contract implies that there is:  
• no distortion with respect to the first-best solution for the efficient Agent; 
• a downwards distortion is determined with respect to the first-best solution for the less efficient 
Agent, such  that: θαθ ∆−−−+= )))(1(1(1)(' HL
A
L efv
vqS  
The solution with induced cooperation has, naturally, second best characteristics due to the cost 
which it generates and only contemplates a gift for the efficient agent. Given the informative rent and 
the probability of crossing each kind of agent, such a cost depends on the Agent’s rate of 
transformation of Self-Esteem into money. 
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Comparing the second-best solution for the less efficient Agent in the case of cooperation with 
the second-best solutions obtained with contracts without punishments [9] and with endogenous 
punishment in the event of the discovery of deception [10] and [11], it can be observed that: 
θθθαθ ∆−+=≤∆−−−+= v
vqSef
v
vqS LLHL
A
L 1
)('))(1(1(
1
)('                  Always   [9] 
θθθαθ ∆−−+=≤∆−−−+= )1(1)('))(1(1(1)(' LL
S
LHL
A
L sv
vqSef
v
vqS       
         if  (1- )(1( Hef−α ) ≤ (1-sL)  [10] 
θθθαθ ∆−−+=>∆−−−+= )1(1)('))(1(1(1)(' LL
S
LHL
A
L sv
vqSef
v
vqS        
 if  (1- )(1( Hef−α ) > (1-sL)  [11] 
Therefore cooperation is chosen (rejected) if the necessary cost of activating altruism               
(1- )(1( Hef−α ) of the more efficient Agent is lower (greater) than the probability (1-sL) of the loss 
connected to the non-punishment (exposure) of the less efficient Agent in the event of fraudulent 
behaviour.   
Finally, consider both altruism and endogenous punishment P and assume that the probability 
of auditing Agents behaviour depends on their rate of transformation of Self-Esteem into money, that is 
))(1(( HH efss −= αα  and ))(1(( LL efss −= αα . Since the cost of auditing c depends on probability of 
discovering a fraudulent behaviour isα , for i=L,H the problem [8] becomes, other things being equal: 
)]}()()[1{(]})))(1((1()([{max
},,,{
LLLLHLLHHHH
GGqq
scqqSvPsqefqqSv
LHHL
αα θθαθ −−−++∆−−+−−  
[12] 
Such that (v) and (xii) are binding. The optimal contract implies that there is:  
• no distortion with respect to the first-best solution for the efficient Agent; 
• a downwards distortion is determined with respect to the first-best solution for the less efficient 
Agent, such  that: θθ ∆−−−−+= ]))(1(1[(1)(' aLHL
A
L sefav
vqS  
This model implies that if the Agent’s rate of transformation of Self-Esteem into money is large 
(small), transfers should be cheap (expensive). It is reasonable (i.e. Gintis, Bowles, Boyd and Fehr 
2003) to assume that induced cooperative behaviour reduces the inefficient Agent’s attitude to deflect 
from agreement and increases the probability of discovering her fraudulent behaviour, that is 
( aLs )>( Ls ) with a lower cost, by effect of Self-Esteem, that is c( aLs )<c( Ls ). In any case even assuming 
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the same probability of discovering the fraudulent behaviour of the less efficient Agent is the same in 
the case of endogenous punishment with or without trust, that is LaL ss =  and c( aLs )=c( Ls ), it will be 
that:  
θαθ α ∆−−−−+= ]))(1(1[(1)(' LHL
A
L sefv
vqS ≤ θθ ∆−−+= )1(1)(' LL
A
L sv
vqS   Always [13] 
θαθ α ∆−−−−+= ]))(1(1[(1)(' LHL
A
L sefv
vqS θαθ ∆−−−+=≤ ))(1(1(1)(' HL
A
L efv
vqS    
            if  0≥Lsα  [14] 
The existence of strong reciprocity and endogenous punishment permits the Principal to 
implement trust and cooperation at the lowest cost. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
Standard economic theory is undeniably too pessimistic as to the possibility of cooperation 
among strangers (Seabright 2004). Genetic relatedness is not the only condition for cooperation to 
develop in situations where self-interest would make destructive opportunism the best course of action. 
A huge bulk of evidence can be invoked to this end. In particular, as Bowles and Gintis have argued, 
many humans seem to adhere to a strong reciprocity rule of behaviour that implies the bearing of a 
personal cost in order to punish those members of the community who defect from cooperation. 
However, the analytical foundation of this type of cooperation-prone behaviour and how it relates to 
rationality have not been yet spelled out. In this paper we have advanced our own explanation relying 
on the notion of self-esteem and modelling cooperation-prone agents in terms both of a moral function 
transforming cooperation into self-esteem and of a utility function which includes self-esteem in its 
argument. On the basis of this model we have drawn a clear distinction between propensity to 
cooperation, on the one hand, and effective cooperation, on the other, which are too often muddled. We 
have also shown the impact of our hypothesis on the best contract a Principal can offer in a typical 
Principal-Agent situation and how it can help understand the role that gift giving and endogenous trust 
can play to counter opportunism.  
Our results support to the idea that the presence of altruists may lead to cooperative solution 
because it can make the eliciting of cooperation the best strategy for standard self-interested agents. 
Moreover there are good reasons to believe that altruists will not be dominated by self-interested 
people in the evolutionary game.  
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Finally, in our definition a moral individual has a high propensity to destroy self-esteem when 
her actions are not consistent with her moral values. This will be reflected in her final utility given that 
self-esteem is positively related to utility. Therefore her actions in so far as they destroy her own self-
esteem through the moral value mechanism are not determined by a too restricted notion of self-
welfare.  
Interesting enough our approach is coherent with the most recent Sen’s criticism of the standard 
rational model of choice based on the notion of self-centred welfare, that is a system in which: a 
person’s welfare depends only on her own consumptions and other features of the richness of her life, 
the welfare maximization is the individual’s only goal and an individual choices are exclusively geared 
to the pursuit of selfish goals (Sen 2002, p. 34-35).  
However, differently from Sen we retain an operating theory of choice that makes people able to 
behave as maximizers, particularly with respect to endogenously determined moral variable. More 
precisely, individuals are endowed with a moral system which transforms their actions into self-esteem. 
The latter, as determined by such system, enters their utility function and concurs to define their choice 
within a utility maximizing process. Therefore, self-esteem brings about utility but its amount is 
determined by a moral system which lies outside individual preference system. Eventually, the 
inclusion of self-esteem in the utility function (which could very well be defined a goal-function) 
allows us to treat the choice problem as a typical maximization problem and give formal solution to it. 
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